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SUMMARY
Based on survey data from 193 banks in 20 countries we provide the first
bank-level analysis of the relationship between bank ownership, bank funding
and foreign currency (FX) lending across emerging Europe. Our results contra-
dict the widespread view that foreign banks have been driving FX lending to
retail clients as a result of easier access to foreign wholesale funding. Our
cross-sectional analysis shows that foreign banks do lend more in FX to
corporate clients but not to households. Moreover, we find no evidence that
wholesale funding had a strong causal effect on FX lending for either foreign or
domestic banks. Panel estimations show that the foreign acquisition of a domes-
tic bank does lead to faster growth in FX lending to households. However, this
is driven by faster growth in household lending in general not by a shift
towards FX lending.
— Martin Brown and Ralph De Haas
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1. INTRODUCTION
Unhedged foreign currency (FX) borrowing is seen as a major threat to financial sta-
bility in emerging Europe. More than 80% of all private sector loans in Belarus, Lat-
via and Serbia are currently denominated in (or linked to) a foreign currency and
the share of FX loans also exceeds that of domestic currency loans in various other
countries including Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania (European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (EBRD), 2010. FX borrowing throughout the region is
dominated by retail loans – household mortgages, consumer credit and small busi-
ness loans – to clients which typically have their income and assets in local currency.
It is therefore not surprising that national authorities have taken measures to dis-
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courage such loans. Supervisors in Hungary, Latvia and Poland have pushed banks
to disclose the exchange rate risks of FX loans to clients and to tighten the eligibility
criteria for such loans. In countries like Croatia, Kazakhstan and Romania stronger
provisioning requirements were imposed on FX compared to local currency loans.
Ukraine even completely banned FX lending to households in late 2008.
The call for policies to curb FX lending in Eastern Europe has intensified lately.
In June 2010 the European Central Bank (ECB) stated that national efforts to rein
in FX lending have had little impact and called for better coordination, including
among home-country regulators of banks with subsidiaries in Eastern Europe.1 In
this line of thinking FX lending is largely supply-driven, with FX funding of banks,
often from their parent banks, at the heart of the problem. Surprisingly, the wide-
spread view that FX lending in Eastern Europe is driven by foreign bank subsidiaries
with access to ample FX funding has not yet been substantiated by empirical ana-
lysis. Comparisons of cross-country data document higher shares of FX lending in
countries where banks have larger cross-border liabilities (Bakker and Gulde, 2010;
Basso et al., 2010). However, whether such liabilities are causing or being caused by
FX loans is hard to establish from aggregate data. Recent loan-level evidence for
Bulgaria suggests that FX lending seems to be at least partly driven by customer
deposits in FX, while wholesale funding in FX is a result rather than a cause of FX
lending (Brown et al., 2010). It is unclear, however, whether this applies to a broad
set of banks across the transition region.
The impact of foreign bank ownership on euroization and financial stability is a
pertinent policy question. After the fall of the Berlin wall governments and develop-
ment institutions actively supported the process of banking integration between
Western and Eastern Europe. This support was based on the presumed positive
impact of foreign bank entry on the efficiency and stability of local banking systems.
The empirical evidence that emerged over the next two decades suggests that for-
eign banks indeed contributed to more efficient (Fries and Taci, 2005) and stable
(De Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2006) banking sectors. However, the recent financial
crisis has hit emerging Europe hard and questions have been raised about foreign
banks’ role in creating the economic imbalances, including large unhedged FX
exposures, which made the region vulnerable. Regulation may help to counterbal-
ance distortions – such as banks and borrowers that disregard the negative external-
ities of FX loans in terms of increasing the risk of a systemic crisis (see Rancie`re
et al., 2010). Our paper contributes to this debate by using bank-level data to
analyse to what extent FX lending in Eastern Europe is related to the presence of
foreign banks and their funding.
Our main data source is the EBRD Banking Environment and Performance
Survey (BEPS) conducted in 2005 and covering 95 foreign-owned and 98
1 http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/financialstabilityreview201006en.pdf.
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domestic-owned banks in 20 transition countries. The BEPS elicits detailed informa-
tion on the loan and deposit structure of each bank in 2001 and 2004, its risk man-
agement, as well as its assessment of local creditor rights and banking regulation.
We match the BEPS data with financial statement data provided by Bureau van
Dijk’s BankScope database and with country-level indicators of the interest rate dif-
ferential on foreign versus local currency funds, exchange rate volatility, inflation
history, and the position of the country on the path towards EU accession.
While we do not cover the immediate run-up to and aftermath of the recent
financial crisis, the observation period covered by our data is particularly interest-
ing to study FX lending dynamics. During this period foreign currency lending
to corporate clients was already widespread in Eastern Europe. For the banks in
our sample the mean share of the corporate loan portfolio denominated in FX
was 41% in 2001 and 44% in 2004. During this three-year period we do, how-
ever, observe a significant increase in FX lending by banks in some countries
(such as Belarus and Estonia) while in other countries (Kazakhstan, Russia) banks
reduced FX lending. Furthermore, FX lending to households increased substan-
tially across Eastern Europe during our observation period. Considering the
banks in our sample, we find that the share of FX loans in their household loan
portfolio increased from 28% in 2001 to 38% in 2004. Our data allow us to
investigate to what extent these developments in FX lending to corporate and
household clients are related to changes in the ownership and funding structure
of banks.
Our results contradict the view that foreign banks have been driving FX lending
to unsuspecting retail clients throughout Eastern Europe as a result of easier access
to cross-border funding. First, our cross-sectional results suggest that while foreign
banks do lend more in FX to corporate clients, they do not do so to households.
Second, while the foreign acquisition of a bank does lead to faster growth in FX
lending to retail clients, this is driven by faster growth in household lending per se
and not by a redirecting of credit from domestic to foreign currency. Third, we find
no evidence that wholesale funding had a strong causal effect on FX lending for
any type of bank over the 2001–2004 period. The correlation between wholesale
funding and FX lending at the bank level is weak. If anything, wholesale funding
seems to be a result rather than a determinant of FX lending.
All in all, our findings tell us that foreign banks did not indiscriminately ‘push’
FX loans through their subsidiary network in the transition region, but followed a
more subtle approach where FX lending is targeted to (corporate) clients that can
carry the associated risks and to countries in which FX lending to households is
attractive from a macroeconomic perspective. These results provide important
insights to policymakers into the drivers of FX lending. In particular, they suggest
that credible macroeconomic policies which encourage depositors to save in local
currency may be more important than regulatory proposals to limit the wholesale
funding of banks.
FOREIGN BANKS IN EMERGING EUROPE 61
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates our study to the
existing theoretical and empirical literature on FX lending. Section 3 describes our
data and Section 4 presents our results. Section 5 sets out our policy conclusions.
2. LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES
In this section we review existing theoretical and empirical studies on the currency
denomination of bank loans, establish the hypotheses for our empirical analysis,
and clarify our contribution to the literature.
2.1. Bank funding
The share of foreign currency assets held by a bank is typically related to the cur-
rency structure of its liabilities because banks are limited by prudential regulation
in the FX exposure they can take. In a country with underdeveloped derivative
markets for foreign currency exchange, banks’ supply of FX loans therefore
depends on their own access to foreign currency funding from depositors, financial
markets and/or parent banks.
Recent evidence for Eastern Europe provides mixed results on the role of bank
funding as a driver of FX lending. Basso et al. (2010) examine aggregate credit
dollarization for 24 transition countries for the period 2000–2006. They find that
countries in which banks have a higher share of foreign funding display a higher
share of FX loans. De Haas and Naaborg (2006) and De Haas and Van Lelyveld
(2006, 2010) show that parent bank funding, typically denominated in FX, influ-
ences the credit growth of foreign subsidiaries. To the extent that subsidiaries do
not swap these funds into local currency, access to parent bank funding may have a
positive impact on FX lending.
Luca and Petrova (2008) by contrast find no robust relation between aggregate
lending in FX across transition countries and aggregate foreign liabilities of banks.
They do, however, find a strong relation between aggregate levels of deposit dollar-
ization and FX lending. Similarly, Brown et al. (2010) provide loan-level evidence
that FX lending is driven by customer funding of banks in FX, rather than whole-
sale funding in FX.
2.2. Banks’ sensitivity to monetary conditions
Banks’ willingness to supply FX loans, and borrowers’ demand for such loans, also
depends on monetary conditions. On the demand side, firms and households are
more likely to request FX loans when interest differentials are high and real
exchange rate volatility is low. Luca and Petrova (2008) examine a model of credit
dollarization in which risk-averse banks and firms choose an optimal portfolio of
foreign and local currency loans. In line with other portfolio-choice models of
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foreign currency debt (Ize and Levy-Yeyati, 2003) they predict that banks offer
more foreign currency loans when the volatility of domestic inflation is high and
the volatility of the real exchange rate is low. Thus, in countries where the mon-
etary authority has not established a credible reputation for pursuing price stability
banks may prefer to make FX loans. As memories of bouts of (hyper)inflation are
persistent, high inflation may lead to the entrenched use of FX even when econo-
mies stabilize (Kokenyne et al., 2010).
Cross-country comparisons of aggregate credit indeed document a strong role for
monetary conditions in explaining the use of foreign currency in emerging
economies. Most recently, Luca and Petrova (2008) analyse the aggregate share of
FX loans for 21 transition countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union between 1990 and 2003. They find that the aggregate share of FX loans is
positively related to interest rate differentials and domestic monetary volatility and
negatively related to the volatility of the exchange rate. Work by Arteta (2005) on a
broad sample of low-income countries, as well as Barajas and Morales (2003) and
Kamil (2009) on Latin America, confirms the hypothesis that higher exchange rate
volatility reduces credit dollarization.
Firm-level studies find more mixed results concerning the impact of monetary
conditions on the currency composition of firm debt. Keloharju and Niskanen
(2001) and Allayanis et al. (2003) find that the use of FX debt by corporate firms is
strongly related to interest rate differentials. Brown et al. (2011) by contrast find
only a weak impact of interest rate differentials and no impact of exchange rate
volatility on the use of FX loans among small firms in transition economies.
2.3. Bank ownership and client structure
A bank’s propensity to lend in FX also reflects the demand it encounters for FX
loans from its clients. This means that to the extent that foreign and domestic
banks serve different types of clients they may also face a different demand for FX
denominated loans. Goswami and Shrikande (2001) show theoretically how firms
may use foreign currency debt as a hedging instrument for the exchange rate exposure
of their revenues.2 Cowan (2006) and Brown et al. (2009b) consider firms’ choices
of loan currency in models where the cost of foreign currency debt is lower than
the cost of local currency debt. Cowan (2006) shows that firms are more likely to
choose foreign currency debt the higher the interest rate differential, the larger their
share of income in foreign currency and the lower their distress costs in case of
default. The incentive to take foreign currency loans is weaker when the volatility
2 The model assumes uncovered interest rate parity, i.e. differences in nominal interest rates are cancelled out by changes in
the exchange rate so that the cost of foreign and local currency borrowing is identical. In such a model interest rate differen-
tials do not motivate foreign currency borrowing. However, evidence suggests that this parity does not hold for many curren-
cies (Froot and Thaler, 1990; Isard, 2006).
FOREIGN BANKS IN EMERGING EUROPE 63
of the exchange rate is higher, as this increases the default risk on unhedged loans.
Brown et al. (2009b) show that not only firms with foreign currency income, but
also firms with high income in local currency (compared to their debt service bur-
den) are more likely to choose foreign currency loans, as their probability to default
due to exchange rate movements is lower. They also examine the impact of bank-
firm information asymmetries on loan currency choice, showing that when lenders
are imperfectly informed about the currency or level of firm revenue, local currency
borrowers may be more likely to choose foreign currency loans.3 While focused on
commercial loans, the models of Cowan (2006) and Brown et al. (2009b) are also
relevant for FX lending to households. They predict that households with assets
denominated in foreign currency, such as real estate in many countries, as well as
households with FX income or high income to debt service levels are more likely to
borrow in foreign currency.
A broad set of studies confirm that the use of FX debt is related to borrower char-
acteristics, in particular borrower income structure. Large firms have been shown to
match loan currencies to those of their sales in the US (Kedia and Mozumdar, 2003),
Europe (Keloharju and Niskanen, 2001), Latin America (Martinez and Werner,
2002; Gelos, 2003; and Benavente et al., 2003) and East Asia (Allayannis et al., 2003).
More recent evidence suggests that the use of a foreign rather than a local cur-
rency loan by retail clients is also strongly related to borrower characteristics.
Brown et al. (2011) examine the currency denomination of the most recent loan
received by 3,105 small firms in 24 transition countries. They find strong evidence
that the choice of an FX loan is related to FX cash flow. In contrast, they find only
weak evidence that FX borrowing is affected by firm-level distress costs or financial
opaqueness. Brown et al. (2010) examine requested and granted loan currencies
using credit-file data for over 100,000 loans to small firms in Bulgaria. They show
that firms with revenue in foreign currency, lower leverage and lower distress costs
are more likely to ask for an FX loan, and are more likely to receive such a loan.
Beer et al. (2010) examine survey data covering over 2,500 Austrian households and
find that those households with higher wealth, higher income and better education
are more likely to have foreign currency (CHF) rather than local currency (EUR)
mortgages. Fidrmuc et al. (2011) show that the intention of households to take FX
loans in Eastern Europe is related to household age, education and savings in FX.
Finally, Degryse et al. (2011) provide evidence that suggests that FX lending in
Poland is related to bank ownership. Examining a dataset on Polish banks for the
period 1996–2006 they find that in particular greenfield foreign banks provide
more FX loans than domestic banks.
3 Banks may not be able to verify the income sources of small firms which do not keep detailed and audited financial records
(Berger and Udell, 1998). This information asymmetry may be particularly pressing in countries with weak corporate
governance (Brown et al., 2009a) and a strong presence of foreign banks which have less knowledge about local firms
(Detragiache et al., 2008).
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This paper contributes to the empirical literature on foreign currency lending
and borrowing by providing bank-level evidence on how FX lending is impacted
by banks’ funding structure, sensitivity to the macroeconomic environment, and
ownership structure. We use our dataset to test three main hypotheses: (i) Access to
FX denominated wholesale and deposit funding has a positive impact on FX lend-
ing; (ii) Banks are more likely to lend in FX in countries with unstable macro
economic conditions, and (iii) Foreign ownership has an independent positive
impact on banks’ proportion and quantity of FX lending, e.g. because foreign
banks are more likely to attract clients with a demand for currency hedging.
By testing these hypotheses with bank-level data for a broad set of transition
economies, we provide micro-evidence on FX lending to both firms and households
and complement cross-country studies of aggregate FX lending such as Luca and
Petrova (2008) and Basso et al. (2010), firm-level and household-level studies such as
Brown et al. (2011) and Fidrmuc et al. (2011), as well as bank-level studies for indi-
vidual countries such as Brown et al. (2010) and Degryse et al. (2011).
3. DATA
3.1. The Banking Environment and Performance Survey (BEPS)
Our main data source is the EBRD Banking Environment and Performance Survey
(BEPS) conducted in 2005 across 20 transition countries. The BEPS elicits detailed
information on the loan and deposit structure, including the currency denomina-
tion, of a large number of banks in 2001 and 2004. Information was also collected
on banks’ risk management and their assessment of creditor rights and banking reg-
ulation. BEPS further provides detailed information on bank ownership, which
allows us to differentiate between three ownership categories: banks with majority
domestic ownership, newly created foreign banks (greenfields), and privatized banks
with majority foreign ownership (takeovers).
From the 1,976 banks operating in the transition region in 2005 the EBRD
approached the 419 banks which were covered by Bureau van Dijk’s BankScope
database. These banks represent more than three-quarters of all banking assets in
the transition region. Of these banks 220 agreed to participate in the BEPS. There
are only small differences between banks that agreed to participate in BEPS and
those that declined. De Haas et al. (2010) provide a detailed description of the
BEPS and how it provides a representative picture of the underlying banking popu-
lation in emerging Europe in terms of bank size and bank ownership. Both in
BankScope and in BEPS 7% of the banks are state-owned and while in BankScope
47% of all banks are foreign owned, in BEPS 55% are foreign owned. Finally,
while in BankScope 45% of all banks are private domestic banks, 38% of all banks
in BEPS belong to this category. There is only a weak relationship between bank
size and inclusion in BEPS.
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The dataset we use in this paper excludes 27 banks for which information on the
currency composition of loans was not available. We thus have a sample of 193
banks from 20 countries, of which 98 are domestic banks (private or state-owned),
44 greenfield foreign banks, and 51 are foreign banks that are the result of a take-
over of a former domestic bank. Table 1 shows the geographical distribution of
these banks over the transition region. The sample is evenly distributed over the
three main sub-regions: Central Europe and the Baltic countries (62 banks), South
Eastern Europe (72 banks), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
(59 banks). In terms of ownership, our sample also reflects that the banking sector
in the CIS has seen less foreign direct investment compared to the other parts of
the transition region.
From the BEPS we yield four indicators of bank-level foreign currency lending
as our dependent variables: FX share corporates is the share of a bank’s outstanding
loan portfolio to firms which is FX denominated. Likewise, FX share households is the
share of the outstanding loan portfolio to households denominated in FX. We
Table 1. Bank ownership by country
Total
Foreign
greenfield
Foreign
takeover Domestic
Foreign
acquired
Central Europe and Baltics (CEB) 62 15 26 21 15
Czech Republic 7 0 4 3 3
Estonia 5 0 4 1 1
Hungary 3 3 0 0 0
Latvia 16 1 6 9 2
Lithuania 5 0 3 2 2
Poland 13 7 4 2 3
Slovak Republic 6 3 3 0 2
Slovenia 7 1 2 4 2
South Eastern Europe (SEE) 72 22 22 28 13
Albania 4 3 1 1
Bosnia 11 3 4 4 2
Bulgaria 11 3 6 2 5
Croatia 11 4 1 6 1
Macedonia 6 0 2 4 2
Romania 11 5 5 1 2
Serbia 18 4 3 11 0
Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS)
59 7 3 49 0
Belarus 9 1 2 6 0
Kazakhstan 7 0 0 7 0
Moldova 8 0 1 7 0
Russia 27 3 0 24 0
Ukraine 8 3 0 5 0
Total 193 44 51 98 28
Note: The table reports the number of banks in our sample by country and ownership type. Foreign greenfield
banks are foreign banks established from scratch, whereas Foreign takeover banks are foreign banks that
are the result of a takeover of a domestic bank by a foreign strategic investor. Foreign acquired banks are
takeover banks that were acquired in 2000, 2001 or 2002. Table 2 provides definitions and sources of all
variables.
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measure both of these variables in 2004 and 2001 and use the 2004 values in our
cross-sectional analysis and the 2004–2001 differences in our panel analysis. In our
panel analysis we further employ two variables – FX growth corporates and FX growth
households – that measure the growth of the volume of FX loans over 2001–2004.
Figure 1 depicts the 2001 and 2004 values for FX share corporates and FX share
households for each of the 193 banks in our dataset. It shows a strong correlation
between the 2001 and 2004 proportion of corporate lending in FX. By contrast,
during this period many banks experienced stronger changes in the currency
denomination of their household loan portfolio. On average, the share of FX loans
to households in our sample increased from 28% in 2001 to 38% in 2004. How-
ever, as Figure 1 shows, these averages mask substantial heterogeneity in the
development of household lending across banks.
While dynamics in FX lending continued after our sample period ended, we
think that the period 2001–2004 – that is, the first half of the 2001–2007 credit
boom in many parts of emerging Europe – is well-suited to study the determinants
of FX lending as it set the scene for later developments. Table A1 in the Appendix
displays country-level data on FX lending. It shows that in many countries the FX
lending dynamics that took place during 2001–2004 continued during the later
years. For instance, our data pick up both the trend towards more FX lending in
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Figure 1. FX lending in 2001 and 2004
Note: This figure plots the 2001 values against the 2004 values for the variables FX share corporates and FX share
households. Table 2 provides definitions and sources of all variables.
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Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Serbia and the trend towards less FX lending in
Albania, Kazakhstan and Russia. Indeed, the overall cross-country correlation
between FX lending in 2004 and 2007 is very high at 0.79 and between 2007 and
2010 even 0.94.
3.2. Explanatory variables
Table 2 provides a description and the source of all variables we use in our empiri-
cal analysis. We construct bank ownership dummies that indicate whether a bank is
a Foreign greenfield bank, a Foreign takeover bank, or a Domestic bank in 2004. Informa-
tion to construct these dummies is taken from BEPS and where needed supple-
mented with information from banks’ websites. We also create a variable Foreign held
which is 1 for all banks that were foreign-owned throughout 2000–2004 and 0 for
all banks that were domestically owned throughout this period. Finally, we construct
a dummy Foreign acquired that identifies banks acquired in 2000, 2001 or 2002.
We use two indicators of the funding structure of a bank. FX deposits is taken
from BEPS and directly captures the share of customer deposits which are FX
denominated. Wholesale funding is taken from BankScope and captures non-customer
liabilities as a share of total liabilities. We employ this variable as an indicator of
wholesale funding in foreign currency. We think this is a reasonable assumption as
much of the transition region remains characterized by very underdeveloped local
currency bond and money markets (EBRD, 2010). As a result, banks find it difficult
if not impossible to supplement their (mainly short-term) domestic deposit base with
longer-term local-currency liabilities. Wholesale funding therefore tends to be FX
denominated, as (the more reputable) banks attract FX debt in the international
capital markets or, in the case of foreign bank subsidiaries, from their parent banks.
De Haas and Naaborg (2006) show how centralized Treasuries operated by multi-
national banks such as SEB, Erste Bank, ING Bank and ABN Amro Bank form the
main source of non-deposit funding for the subsidiaries of these banks in emerging
Europe.
Both our measures of bank funding may be endogenous to FX lending. In our
cross-sectional analysis we therefore add a specification in which we instrument
both. Our instrument for Wholesale funding is the variable Internal ratings which indic-
ates whether the bank used an internal ratings based approach in 2004. Banks that
use such an approach tend to be relatively sophisticated and in a better position to
attract wholesale funding. Our instrument for FX deposits is the variable Corporate
deposits which measures the share of customer deposits from firms. FX deposits may
be directly related to a bank’s focus on corporate clients as (exporting) firms tend to
have more access to FX and deposit this at their bank. Section 4.1 provides details
on our instrumentation strategy.
At the bank-level we control for bank size with the variable Assets which meas-
ures total bank assets in log USD. This indicator is taken from BankScope and is a
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measure of both client structure and bank-funding structure. On the one hand, lar-
ger banks are more likely to serve large firms, which may have a higher demand
for FX debt. On the other hand, larger banks may have better access to cross-
border wholesale funding.
In our empirical analysis we alternatively employ country fixed effects and
country-level explanatory variables to account for cross-country variation in macro-
economic conditions. Our country-level explanatory variables are taken from the
EBRD Transition Report and the IMF International Financial Statistics. Interest
differential is the difference between reference interest rates on the domestic currency
and the euro. Exrate volatility captures the variation of month-on-month changes in
the nominal exchange rate of the domestic currency to the euro. Interest advantage
combines the preceding two variables into one summary measure of the relative
advantage of borrowing in a foreign currency. It divides Interest differential by the
Exrate volatility (plus 1) and can be seen as a reward-to-variability or Sharpe ratio
that measures the benefit of borrowing in euro, rather than in the local currency,
per unit of exchange rate risk.
Besides the above measures of contemporary monetary conditions we attempt
to control for past and future macroeconomic stability which may affect FX lend-
ing. Inflation history measures the mean annual inflation rate over the preceding
period 1994–2003. Lastly, we create a variable EU accession which indicates for
each country and year in the 2001–2004 period whether a country had com-
pleted EU accession negotiations. This yearly score is then averaged over the
sample period.
3.3. Descriptive statistics
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for all our variables. Panel A reports sum-
mary statistics for the full sample as well as means by bank-ownership and region.
Panel B shows summary statistics for our country-level variables. Table A2 in the
Appendix provides a matrix of pair-wise correlations. Table 3 shows that in 2004,
44% of all corporate lending and 38% of all household lending by the banks in our
sample was denominated in FX. Differences in the share of FX lending are sub-
stantial across banks, with some banks displaying no FX loans while other banks
have their entire loan portfolio in FX. Between 2001 and 2004 there was an
average increase of 3 and 10 percentage points, respectively, in the proportion of
corporate and household loans denominated in FX.
The table confirms that foreign banks lend more in FX. However, there is a
marked difference between lending to firms and to households. For corporate
clients we see that in 2004 both greenfield and takeover foreign banks display a
higher share of FX lending than domestic banks. Interestingly, the share of FX
loans to firms by takeover banks converges to that of greenfield banks between
2001 and 2004, while FX lending by domestic banks to firms did not increase. For
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household loans we find that the share of FX lending increased strongly for all
ownership types. In contrast to corporate lending, we also find that in 2004 the
share of household loans in FX is similar for foreign takeover banks and domestic
Table 3. Descriptive statistics
Panel A. Bank-level variables
Variable
name
Full sample
summary statistics
Means by
bank-ownership
Means by
region
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Green
field
Take
over Domestic CEB SEE CIS
Cross-sectional analysis: 2004
FX share
corporates
179 44.0 28.9 0 100 51.3 50.4 37.6 44.6 45.2 42.0
FX share
households
174 38.0 36.1 0 100 45.7 36.1 35.5 32.0 36.1 46.1
Assets 187 20.0 1.6 16 24.1 20.1 20.7 19.7 20.9 19.5 19.8
Wholesale
funding
187 31.9 22.2 1 99 44.0 28.6 27.8 34.4 27.8 34.0
FX deposits 176 41.7 23.6 0 99 43.0 37.2 43.4 34.9 49.3 39.8
Corporate
deposits
177 45.1 24.7 0 100 49.5 39.0 46.1 43.4 43.2 49.4
Internal
ratings
178 0.80 0.40 0 1 0.80 0.84 0.78 0.74 0.79 0.89
Panel analysis: 2004 minus 2001
FX share
corporates
166 2.5 20.4 )54 98 0.7 10.0 )0.1 5.3 4.2 )2.1
FX share
households
158 9.8 32.4 )95 100 11.5 9.6 9.2 3.2 10.9 15.3
FX growth
corporates
127 6.7 26.1 )1 270 12.6 8.2 3.1 3.6 14.0 3.2
FX growth
households
77 4.7 5.9 )1 33 4.1 6.1 4.2 4.0 5.4 5.0
Assets 155 1.0 0.5 )0.7 2.9 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1
Wholesale
funding
155 3.0 15.3 )42 50 4.5 5.4 0.9 4.1 4.0 0.6
FX deposits 167 )4.1 16.0 )52 62 )3.4 )2.1 )5.5 )2.4 )4.2 )5.9
Panel B. Country-level variables
Variable name
Full sample summary statistics Means by region
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max CEB SEE CIS
Country-level variables: 2001–2004 averages
Interest differential 20 6.9 9.2 0.4 37.4 2.9 7.8 12.0
Exrate volatility 20 2.8 2.1 0.0 8.0 2.1 1.8 5.2
Interest advantage 20 1.7 1.5 0.1 4.8 0.9 2.5 1.6
Inflation history 20 60 93 2 371 11 42 165
EU accession 20 0.2 0.3 0 0.5 0.5 0 0
Note: This table provides summary statistics for the 2004 values and 2004–2001 differences of our bank-level
and country-level variables. Region definitions CEB, SEE and CIS are in accordance with those listed in
Table 1. Table 2 provides variable definitions and sources.
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banks with both bank types displaying a lower level of FX loans than foreign green-
field banks.4
Looking at banks’ funding structure, we find that on average 32% of total liabil-
ities is Wholesale funding, while 42% of bank deposits are denominated in FX. Green-
field foreign banks rely much more on wholesale funding (44%) compared to
foreign takeover banks (29%) or domestic banks (28%). By contrast, the foreign cur-
rency share of deposits is similar for all bank types, indicating that the ‘euroization’
of deposits is mostly driven by the macroeconomic environment. Interestingly, dur-
ing 2001–2004 the share of FX deposits in total deposits declined by about four
percentage points.
To what extent is FX lending by the banks in our sample related to their funding
structure? The scatter plots in Figure 2 provide some first insights into this issue.
The figure shows no apparent bivariate relationship between the proportion of
wholesale funding and FX lending. By contrast, banks with a large share of FX
denominated customer deposits lend more in FX. In line with this, Table A2 in the
Appendix shows that whereas the pair-wise correlation between wholesale funding
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Figure 2. FX lending and bank funding in 2004
Note: This figure plots FX share corporates and FX share households against Wholesale funding and FX deposits. All
data refer to 2004. For comparability with Figure 1 we include only banks with observations for FX share
corporates and FX share households in 2004 and 2001. Table 2 provides definitions and sources of all variables.
4 Degryse et al. (2011) also find that in particular greenfield foreign banks provide more FX loans than domestic banks.
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and corporate and household FX lending is only 0.16 (p = 0.04) and 0.13
(p = 0.09), respectively, the correlations between the proportion of FX deposits and
both types of FX lending are 0.44 (p = 0.00) and 0.43 (p = 0.00). This is in line
with findings by Brown et al. (2010) and Fidrmuc et al. (2011) on the importance of
FX deposits for FX lending.
4. MULTIVARIATE RESULTS
The cross-sectional and panel analyses in this section examine to what extent there
is a causal relationship between foreign ownership, bank funding and FX lending.
4.1. Cross-sectional variation in FX lending
Table 4 provides a cross-sectional analysis of banks’ share of FX lending to corpor-
ate clients (left-hand panel) and households (right-hand panel) in 2004. In line with
the hypotheses developed in Section 2, we analyse the impact of bank ownership,
bank funding and the macroeconomic environment. The first column in each panel
displays an OLS specification in which the share of FX lending is explained by
bank ownership, bank funding and bank size.
In Columns 2 and 7 we account for the endogeneity of a bank’s funding struc-
ture by instrumenting our variables Wholesale funding and FX deposits with Internal rating
and Corporate deposits, respectively. Our analysis suggests that the chosen instruments
are valid, strong and span our endogenous regressors. When we run second-stage
regressions where we add these instruments as additional regressors they do not have
an independent impact on FX lending, suggesting that the instruments are valid.
Our instruments are highly correlated with the endogenous regressors in the
first-stage regressions and thus relatively strong. Finally, the reported Kleibergen–
Paap statistics show that our regression specification is not underidentified. Table A3
in the Appendix reports the first-stage results of our instrumental variable analysis.
In Columns 3–4 and 8–9 we add to this IV specification country-level indicators
of the macroeconomic environment. Finally, in Columns 5 and 10 we interact these
macroeconomic indicators with foreign bank ownership to examine whether foreign
banks react differently to contemporaneous monetary conditions and long-term
macroeconomic stability.5 As these two specifications also contain country fixed
effects, we do not include the macroeconomic indicators as stand-alone variables
but only when interacted with the bank-ownership variables.
5 Since some banks provide no FX loans at all, we also ran models where we first estimate a probit regression and then a
conditional OLS. This yields similar results to the unconditional OLS results reported in Table 4. The same holds when we
estimate Tobit regressions. Note that the proportion of FX lending is naturally bound between 0 and 100 and not truly cen-
sored, which makes OLS a more appropriate estimation technique than Tobit regressions.
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Table 4 displays four key findings. First, foreign ownership is associated with a
higher share of FX loans to firms but not to households. Columns 2–4 show that
greenfield (takeover) foreign banks lend 17 (12) percentage points more in FX than
domestic banks. In sharp contrast, bank ownership does not impact FX lending to
households. Why do foreign banks lend more in FX to firms but not to households?
One reason may be that households are a relatively homogenous borrower group
whereas firms are more diverse. Foreign banks may serve a different set of corpor-
ate clients with a higher demand for FX loans, for instance because they are larger
and better diversified or because they have FX revenues that need to be hedged.
Indeed, the BEPS data indicate that foreign banks lend significantly more to
subsidiaries of international firms than domestic banks (see also De Haas et al.
2010).
Our second finding is that Wholesale funding of banks seems to be a result rather
than a determinant of FX lending. The coefficients in Columns 1 and 6 suggest
that there is a relation between wholesale funding and FX lending. However, once
we account for the endogeneity of wholesale funding (by instrumenting it with
Internal rating) its coefficient is no longer significant at any conventional level.
Our third finding is that there does seem to be a causal impact of foreign
denominated customer deposits on FX lending. The coefficients reported in
Columns 1 and 6, respectively, suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in FX
deposits by customers increases the share of FX loans to firms by 5% and to house-
holds by 7%. Not surprisingly, the impact on FX share corporates loses statistical and
economic significance once we account for the potential endogeneity of deposits.
This indicates that FX deposits is partially endogenous, as FX lending to (inter-
national) firms and access to FX deposits by these firms is determined simultaneously.
Interestingly, and in line with this interpretation, the same instrumentation strat-
egy does not reduce the significance of FX deposits in the right-hand panel. In the
case of lending to households, access to FX deposits is exogenous and has a causal
impact on FX lending to retail clients. Note, however, that the coefficient becomes
insignificant once we include country fixed effects in Column 10. Our result is thus
mainly driven by between-country variation in FX deposits rather than between-
bank variation in access to FX deposits within countries. The impact of FX denom-
inated customer deposits on the share of FX lending to households confirms recent
findings by Brown et al. (2010) and Luca and Petrova (2008).
Our fourth finding is that long-term macroeconomic conditions rather than con-
temporaneous monetary conditions affect FX lending. In particular, we find that
banks in countries with a history of high inflation (over the period 1994–2003) show
a higher proportion of FX lending. This may suggest that in countries with ‘infla-
tion traumas’ banks are more reluctant to lend in local currency. An alternative
explanation is that FX lending is related to a history of real appreciation of the
local currency. Our data show that in emerging Europe high levels of past inflation
are associated with real appreciation of the local currency. Indeed, when we replace
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the variable Past inflation in Table 4 with the variable Trend appreciation, which meas-
ures the mean real appreciation of the local currency over the period 1994–2003,
we find that FX lending is indeed higher in countries that have experienced trend
appreciation in the past.
For FX lending to firms we also find that progress with EU accession, and the
associated macroeconomic and institutional stabilization, had a positive effect on the
proportion of FX lending. Progress towards EU accession may somewhat para-
doxically have increased the incentives for denominating debt in FX as the ‘cer-
tainty’ of a euro exit, and the expectation of nominal exchange rate stability during
the convergence trajectory, made FX lending more attractive even when interest-
rate differences came down at the same time. Indeed, in line with recent evidence
by Brown et al. (2009), we find that neither interest-rate differentials nor nominal
exchange-rate volatility is significantly related to FX lending. The main macro
economic determinants seem to be past inflation and real appreciation as well as
the expected stabilization of EU accession.
In Columns 5 and 10 we examine whether FX lending by foreign banks is more
sensitive to the macroeconomic environment. Foreign banks may be more reluctant to
lend in domestic currency if they mistrust macroeconomic policy more than domestic
banks. We therefore interact our macroeconomic indicators with the dummy variable
Foreign, which is 1 for greenfield and takeover foreign banks (while also including
country fixed effects).6 Our results suggest that foreign banks are not significantly more
sensitive to the host-country macroeconomic environment than domestic banks.
Throughout much of central and south-eastern Europe the euro has been the
main currency used for FX lending and we have therefore calculated our variables
Interest rate differential, Exrate volatility, and Interest advantage relative to euro interest and
exchange rates. However, in a number of countries many FX loans are denomin-
ated in either the Swiss franc (Hungary and Poland)7 or the US dollar (Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine). As a robustness test we therefore ran
the regressions in Table 4 while replacing the exchange rate of the local currency
vis-a`-vis the euro with the exchange rate vis-a`-vis the Swiss franc or the US dollar
for the countries mentioned above. Our results remain virtually unchanged in terms
of economic and statistical significance, reflecting the co-movement of these foreign
currencies relative to the currencies of emerging Europe during 2001–2004.
As the BEPS survey does not cover all bank types in all countries, the effects of
foreign bank-ownership indentified in Table 4 may simply be capturing omitted
cross-country differences in financial sector, economic or institutional conditions.
To assess whether we are mixing ownership effects with country effects we run
6 We do not distinguish between greenfield and takeover foreign banks here because unreported regression results show no
significant differences in the interaction effects between these two types of foreign banks.
7 Brown et al. (2009c) show that Poland and Hungary are the only two transition economies with a significant share of for-
eign currency loans denominated in Swiss francs.
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robustness tests where we exclude those countries for which we only have informa-
tion on one type of bank. In further robustness tests we also control for whether
the bank is a member of a multinational bank network, as well as for additional
characteristics (mean loan size, share of real-estate loans) of the loan portfolio held
by each bank. Each of these robustness tests confirms our cross-sectional finding
that foreign bank ownership is associated with more FX lending to corporates (but
not to households).
Summing up, our cross-sectional results contradict widespread views concerning for-
eign bank ownership, bank funding and FX lending. First, we find that foreign banks
lend more in FX to corporate clients but not to retail clients. Second, we find only a
very weak relationship between wholesale funding and FX lending, with the former
being a result, rather than a determinant of the latter. These results are remarkable as
they run counter to the view that foreign banks, using cheap funding from abroad,
have been ‘pushing’ FX loans into the hands of unsuspecting retail borrowers.
We further find that long-term macroeconomic stability (past inflation/trend
appreciation and EU accession) rather than contemporaneous monetary conditions
are associated with persistently high shares of FX lending by both domestic and for-
eign banks. Indirectly, the macroeconomic environment may play an important role
as well. We find that between countries – but not so much within countries – a
higher proportion of FX deposits is linked to higher proportions of FX lending, in
particular to households. As shown by De Nicolo et al. (2005) the macroeconomic
environment is a key driver of deposit dollarization.
4.2. Foreign ownership and changes in banks’ FX lending over time
It is difficult to establish a causal relationship between bank ownership or funding
and FX lending from our cross-sectional results alone. First, the observed impact of
customer funding may be driven by omitted bank characteristics, for example
customers with income in FX, which affect both FX deposits and FX lending. Sec-
ond, the observed impact of (long-term) macroeconomic instability may be driven by
unobserved country characteristics, for example institutional weaknesses which may
be correlated with both weak macroeconomic policies and the absence of (exporting)
firms which demand FX loans. Third, the observed relation between foreign bank
ownership and FX lending to corporate clients may be due to reverse causality. For-
eign banks may be more likely to enter countries where there are more clients with a
demand for financial services in foreign currency, that is, countries with more
export-oriented firms or a real estate market that is denominated in euro. Foreign
institutions may also be more likely to take over domestic banks that already have a
clientele that use financial services in foreign currency.8 In this section, we try to
8 For foreign banks like ABN Amro, Bank Austria and Raiffeisen, serving foreign firms – in particular home-country clients –
has been an important part of their expansion strategy into emerging Europe (De Haas and Naaborg, 2006).
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mitigate concerns about omitted variables and reverse causality by looking at changes
in banks’ FX lending between 2001 and 2004, controlling for time-invariant bank
characteristics and changes in the macroeconomic environment.
In Table 5 we control for omitted bank-level variables by running first-difference
regressions using a sub-sample of banks that did not change their ownership during
2000–2004. We examine changes in the share and the volume of FX lending between
2001 and 2004. The dependent variables in the left-hand side panel are the percent-
age-point change in FX share corporate/households between 2001 and 2004.9 The depen-
dent variables in the right-hand side panel are FX growth corporates/
households, that is, the percentage-point change in the volume of FX lending to these
clients. Likewise all independent variables – with the obvious exception of the Foreign
held dummy – are expressed in changes as well. We control for changes in country
specific monetary conditions with country fixed effects. The results presented in
Table 5 suggest that foreign bank ownership did not impact the change in either the
share or the volume of FX lending to firms or households.
Table 5. Foreign ownership and changes in FX lending (2001–2004)
Dependent
variable
FX share (2004 minus 2001) FX growth
Corporates Households Corporates Households
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Foreign held 5.065 9.8 2.596 0.325 14.82 12.88 1.128 1.087
[5.389] [6.017] [5.834] [6.779] [14.96] [12.80] [1.455] [1.538]
Bank-level changes 2004–2001:
Assets 0.503 3.744
[2.822] [11.53]
Wholesale
funding
0.0081 0.238 0.208 )0.0167
[0.111] [0.272] [0.192] [0.0257]
FX deposits )0.0494 0.383 0.063 0.0409
[0.152] [0.253] [0.108] [0.0355]
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Country-fixed
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.23 0.37 0.39 0.45 0.22 0.27 0.37 0.44
No. of banks 135 106 126 99 102 96 62 58
No. of countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 14 14
Notes: In this table we examine the sample of banks that were either domestically owned or foreign owned
during the entire period 2000–2004 and which report data on FX lending for 2001 and 2004. The dependent
variables are the percentage point changes (2004 minus 2001) in either the share of FX lending (Columns
1–4) or in the amount of FX lending (Columns 5–8). All models report OLS estimates with country fixed
effects. Standard errors are reported in brackets and are adjusted for clustering at the country level.
***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level.
Table 2 provides definitions and sources of all variables.
9 A number of banks change their proportion of FX lending very considerably between 2001 and 2004. We undertook a
robustness test where we exclude extreme values in the dependent variables by trimming at the 5th and 95th percentile. This
does not change our results.
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4.3. Foreign acquisition and changes in banks’ FX lending over time
In Table 6 we control for reverse causality in the observed relationship between
foreign bank ownership and FX lending by analysing whether the currency com-
position of bank lending changes when a domestic bank is taken over by a foreign
strategic investor. As in Table 5, the dependent variables are the percentage-point
change in FX share corporates/households (left-hand side) and FX growth corporate/
households (right-hand side). To measure the impact of foreign acquisition we limit
our sample to those banks which were domestically owned before 2000 and com-
pare banks that remained domestically owned over 2000–2004 to those that were
taken over by a foreign bank in 2000, 2001 or 2002. The latter are captured by
the dummy Foreign acquired.10
The results presented in Panel A of Table 6 suggest that there is no effect of for-
eign acquisition on FX lending to corporates. The coefficients for Foreign acquired in
Columns 1–2 and 5–6 suggest that neither the share of bank lending in FX nor the
growth of the FX loan volume to corporate clients differs between acquired and
non-acquired banks.
The foreign acquisition of a domestic bank does, by contrast, impact FX lending
to households. The results in Columns 7–8 suggest that after a take-over, acquired
banks expand the volume of FX lending to households by almost 10 percentage
points more than banks that remain in domestic hands. Interestingly though, the
stronger increase in FX loan volume to households does not appear to be driven
by an increase in the share of household loans extended in FX. The results
displayed in Columns 3–4 suggest that foreign acquisition has no impact on FX
share households. These results suggest that the main effect of foreign acquisition is to
accelerate the growth of household lending by banks. This leads to a faster growth
of FX loans to households, even though the share of FX loans in the household
loan portfolio does not increase.
A concern with our analysis in Panel A of Table 6 is selection bias. Foreign insti-
tutions choose to take over particular domestic banks. If our regressions omit indic-
ators which are relevant for the takeover decision, and these indicators are
positively correlated with initial FX lending, then we may underestimate the impact
of foreign acquisition on the subsequent change in FX lending. In Table 6B we
therefore report a propensity scoring exercise in which we attempt to mitigate
potential selection bias by comparing banks that were taken over by a foreign bank
with similar banks that were not taken over (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).11
10 Our definition of Foreign acquired implies that after a takeover in 2000, 2001 or 2002 there are four, three and two years,
respectively, during which the integration into a multinational group may have influenced the FX lending of these banks.
This should be enough time to pick up an effect of foreign ownership as the parent bank may in principle start providing its
new subsidiary with intrabank funding as soon as the takeover is finalized.
11 See Havrylchyk and Jurzyk (2010) for a similar application to investigate the impact of foreign bank ownership on the per-
formance and market power of acquired banks.
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Table 6. Foreign acquisition and changes in FX lending (2001–2004)
Panel A. OLS regressions
Dependent
variable
FX share (2004 minus 2001) FX growth
Corporates Households Corporates Households
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Foreign acquired )4.859 )5.388 2.229 )0.577 1.046 1.926 8.724** 9.831**
[4.759] [7.663] [5.005] [8.352] [2.001] [2.305] [3.789] [3.804]
Bank-level changes 2004–2001:
Assets )2.155 )3.571
[3.479] [7.537]
Wholesale funding 0.151 0.195 )0.00955 )0.0565
[0.175] [0.271] [0.0651] [0.0609]
FX deposits )0.0253 0.13 )0.0533** 0.0702*
[0.239] [0.134] [0.0237] [0.0339]
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.21 0.32 0.42 0.52 0.19 0.28 0.44 0.75
No. of banks 117 89 115 87 90 82 60 54
No. of countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 14 14
Notes: In this panel we compare the change in FX lending (2004 minus 2001) by domestic banks which were
acquired in 2000, 2001 or 2002 to the change in FX lending by domestic banks that were not acquired. The
dependent variables are percentage point changes in the share of FX lending (Columns 1–4) or the growth
(2004 minus 2001) of FX volume in % (Columns 5–8). All models report OLS estimates with country-fixed
effects. Standard errors are reported in brackets and are adjusted for clustering at the country level.
***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level.
Table 2 provides definitions and sources of all variables.
Panel B. Controlling for endogenous acquisition – Propensity score matching
Acquired Not acquired Difference S.E. t-stat
FX share (2004 minus 2001)
Corporates Unmatched 2.82 4.91 )2.09 5.29 )0.39
Nearest neighbour matching 2.28 8.37 )6.09 9.78 )0.62
Kernel matching 5.84 5.83 0.01 6.99 0.00
Households Unmatched 2.52 1.83 0.69 6.23 0.11
Nearest neighbour matching 3.02 5.71 )2.69 8.41 )0.32
Kernel matching 0.64 8.70 )8.06 9.46 )0.85
FX growth
Corporates Unmatched 4.96 3.71 1.25 1.51 0.83
Nearest neighbour matching 4.09 2.76 1.33 1.68 0.79
Kernel matching 5.63 3.69 1.95 2.16 0.9
Households Unmatched 9.64 3.29 6.35 2.14 2.96***
Nearest neighbour matching 9.64 3.38 6.26 3.23 1.94**
Kernel matching 9.64 3.39 6.25 3.22 1.94**
Notes: In this panel we compare the change in FX lending (2004 minus 2001) by domestic banks which were
acquired in 2000, 2001 or 2002 to the change in FX lending by domestic banks that were not acquired. The propen-
sity to be acquired is estimated as a function of the banks Asset volume (log USD, in 2000) and a set of country dum-
mies. The table reports treatment effects based on unmatched comparisons as well as nearest neigbour matching
(with a common support requirement) and kernel matching. ***, ** denote significance at the 0.01 and 0.05-level.
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In a first step we run a probit regression on the sub-sample of domestic banks in
2000 in which the dependent variable is Foreign acquired. This probit regression
yields a propensity score (the conditional probability of a bank being acquired given
pre-acquisition characteristics) for each bank. As explanatory variables in the first-
step regression we include bank size and country-fixed effects. We expect that
acquiring banks are mainly interested in large banks, as they search for a minimum
presence and scale in a country. The first-stage probit regression results (available
upon request from the authors) show that bank size is indeed an important determi-
nant of the acquisition probability. In addition, various country-fixed effects are sig-
nificant, indicating that foreign strategic investors targeted particular countries
more than others, for instance because of a higher credit-growth potential and a
better institutional environment.
In a second step we match each ‘treated’ (acquired) bank to similar banks that
were not acquired by a strategic investor. We either match an acquired bank to the
closest propensity score (nearest neighbour match with a common-support require-
ment) or use Gaussian kernel matching.12 The results in Table 6B confirm our find-
ing of Table 6A that over the 2001–2004 period acquired banks expanded their
FX loan volume (but not their FX loan share) to households significantly faster than
banks that remained in domestic hands. Again, we find no relation between foreign
acquisition and changes in FX lending to corporate clients.
4.4. Convergence of FX lending within countries and multinational banks
In this section we examine the role of foreign banks in spreading FX lending within
countries (to domestic banks). We also examine their role in spreading FX lending
across countries through their multinational networks. Panel A of Table 7 displays the
results for within-country and Panel B for within-network dispersion of FX lending.
Panel A reports regressions on our sample of banks for which information on FX
lending is available for 2001 and 2004. We relate the change in FX share corporate/
households over the 2001–2004 period to the dummy variable Low FX 2001 in country
which is 1 if in 2001 a bank had a lower proportion of FX lending compared to
the country average. As in Tables 5 and 6 we control for cross-country variation in
changes in macroeconomic conditions through country fixed-effects.
The results provide evidence for convergence of FX lending within countries.
Banks with below-average levels of FX lending in 2001 increased the share of FX
loans the fastest between 2001 and 2004. A bank that had below-average FX
lending in 2001 subsequently increased its proportion of FX lending to firms and
12 In the latter case the counterfactual outcome is calculated as a kernel-weighted average of the outcomes of all non-
acquired banks. Weights are inversely proportional to the distance between the propensity scores of acquired and non-
acquired banks.
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households by 14% and 18% more, respectively, compared to banks in the same
country that had above average shares of FX loans in 2001.
Kira´ly et al. (2009) point out that in the case of Hungary the combination of for-
eign-bank ownership and intense inter-bank competition was a key determinant of
FX lending. Did foreign banks start the euroization process while intense competi-
tion merely forced domestic banks to follow their foreign competitors? We find no
evidence that the catching up effect identified above is driven in particular by
domestic or foreign banks. In Columns 2, 3, 5 and 6 we examine whether foreign
banks spread FX lending to domestic banks during our observation period. We
interact the variable Low FX 2001 in country with a Foreign held dummy, which is one
for banks that were already foreign owned in 2000, or a Foreign acquired dummy,
which is one for banks that became foreign owned in 2000, 2001 or 2002. The
results are in line with banking competition increasing FX lending as a two-way
rather than as a unidirectional process.
In Panel B of Table 7 we examine whether foreign banks spread FX lending
across countries through their multinational networks. For this exercise we analyse
a sub-sample of banks which belong to a multinational banking group – such as
UniCredit Group, Raiffeisen International or Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale – for which we have
at least three subsidiaries from the group in our sample. We relate changes in FX
share corporates/households between 2001 and 2004 to a dummy variable Low FX 2001
within network which is 1 for subsidiaries with a proportion of FX lending below the
2001 average for the group they belong to. As in Panel A we find positive coeffi-
cients for the variable Low FX 2001 although the estimates are not precisely estim-
ated. We cannot conclude that during our observation period multinational
banking groups used their internal capital markets to spread FX lending throughout
their network.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
We use a unique dataset – containing detailed information on the loan and deposit
structure of nearly 200 banks in 20 transition economies – to examine how FX
lending is related to bank ownership, bank funding and the macroeconomic envir-
onment. We focus on the extent to which foreign-owned banks and wholesale fund-
ing have contributed to the widespread use of FX lending in emerging Europe.
Overall our results contradict the view that foreign-owned banks have been driving
FX lending to unsuspecting retail clients throughout Eastern Europe as a result of eas-
ier access to cross-border wholesale funding. First, our cross-sectional results suggest
that while foreign banks do lend more in FX to corporate clients, they do not do so to
retail clients. Second, while foreign acquisition of a bank does lead to faster growth in
FX lending to households, this is driven by faster growth in household lending per se,
and not be a redirecting of household credit from domestic to foreign currency. Third,
we find no evidence that wholesale funding had a strong causal effect on FX lending
FOREIGN BANKS IN EMERGING EUROPE 85
for any type of bank over the 2001–2004 period. The correlation between wholesale
funding and FX lending at the bank level is weak, and if anything wholesale funding
seems to be a result rather than a determinant of FX lending.
Our results also contradict the view that foreign bank presence spread the FX lend-
ing to domestic banks in emerging Europe. We do find evidence for a within-country
convergence process of FX lending. However, we show that both foreign and domestic
banks with low levels of FX lending in 2001 – compared to the country average – let
their FX lending increase faster over the subsequent three years. Finally, at the coun-
try level, our results suggest that banks’ FX lending is driven by long-term macro-
economic stability rather than contemporaneous monetary conditions. In particular,
a history of high inflation and prospective EU accession are associated with high levels
of euroization. Again, this holds for both domestic and foreign banks.
All in all, our findings tell us that foreign banks did not indiscriminately ‘push’
FX loans through their subsidiary network in the transition region, but followed a
more cautionary approach where FX lending is targeted to (corporate) clients that
can carry the associated risks and to countries in which FX lending to households
is attractive from a macroeconomic and institutional perspective. Our results pro-
vide important insights to policymakers into the drivers of FX lending in Eastern
Europe. They show that FX customer deposits rather than wholesale funding have
been a key driver of FX lending in the region. This suggests that credible macro-
economic policies which encourage customers to save in local currency may in
many countries be more important than regulatory proposals to limit the wholesale
funding of (foreign) banks.
Indeed, countries like the Czech Republic and Poland demonstrate how adher-
ence to credible macroeconomic policies can result in relatively low levels of FX
lending even when a majority of the banking system is foreign owned. Similarly,
various Latin American countries have successfully de-dollarized by moving to macro-
economic regimes that were more conducive to local currency funding, including
flexible exchange rate regimes and inflation targeting (see Zettelmeyer et al., 2010).
Having said that, our results also indicate that macroeconomic stabilization within
the framework of a credible political commitment to eventual euro adoption, may
actually stimulate firms and households to disregard any residual currency risk and
expand their FX borrowing.
In countries with weak monetary and fiscal institutions a strong regulatory
response to reduce FX lending may even be counterproductive as lending in
domestic currency is not a realistic alternative in the short term. In those cases,
reducing FX lending through regulation may just lead to less credit. The current
policies in Ukraine and Belarus, where new FX denominated mortgages (Ukraine)
or all FX retail loans (Belarus) have been banned, may come at the cost of an even
sharper decline in bank lending.
This is not to say that regulation can or should not play a role in reducing FX
lending. In a second-best world where monetary credibility is not instantly
86 MARTIN BROWN AND RALPH DE HAAS
attainable, regulation may be an optimal instrument, at least for some time. Regu-
lation may well be advisable if banks and their customers create (unhedged) FX
debt whilst disregarding that growing currency mismatches may increase the
probability of a systemic crisis. Such behaviour may become apparent when banks
count on an explicit or implicit government commitment to maintain nominal
exchange rate stability (see Rancie`re et al., 2010) such as in the run-up to euro
membership. In such cases, regulators may for instance require banks to hold unre-
munerated reserve requirements on their FX funding or may introduce higher capi-
tal and/or provisioning requirements for FX loans. Poland has been successful in
weighing against the tide of FX lending by introducing Recommendation S in
2006, which required banks to apply stricter credit underwriting standards and to
disclose FX risks when providing FX mortgages. Measures like these may partially
restore a level playing field between FX and local currency loans and force banks
and their borrowers to take the externalities of their lending decisions into account.
Finally, we should underline that our empirical analysis has focused quite nar-
rowly on the impact of bank funding and ownership on the currency composition
of credit across emerging Europe. Even though we do not find that foreign banks
have had a strong influence on the share of FX lending, we do find that they have
been instrumental in pushing the amount of household lending (both in local and
foreign currencies). Given the underdeveloped nature of mortgage and consumer
credit markets across emerging Europe this development should in principle be
viewed positively, as it has allowed households to better smooth consumption over
time. Yet, previous crises in emerging markets as well as developed countries have
shown that episodes of rapid financial deepening may turn into self-fulfilling and
unsustainable credit booms. Indeed, many countries in Emerging Europe – includ-
ing the Baltic States, Ukraine and Kazakhstan – are still recovering from burst
credit and real estate bubbles. To the extent that foreign banks played a particular
role in financing these bubbles – again, regardless of the currency of denomination
of this financing – they may still have contributed to financial instability. We leave
this issue, as well as the role that access to finance has played in shaping house-
holds’ ability to cope with the crisis, for future research.
Discussion
Ce´dric Tille
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva and CEPR
The reliance on loans denominated in foreign currencies has long been a highly rel-
evant question for emerging market economies. Such financing has a clear appeal
from the borrower’s point of view in the form of a lower interest rate, reflecting the
fact that the lender does not bear the exchange rate risk. This advantage comes at
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the cost of magnifying the impact of exchange rate crisis. A sharp fall in the ex-
ternal value of the emerging economy’s currency raises the debt burden in terms of
local currency, which can push the borrower into insolvency. This drawback of for-
eign currency borrowing played a central role in the emerging market crises of the
1990s, as well as in the current crisis where borrowers in emerging Europe, which
had accumulated a substantial debt in foreign currency, saw the local-currency
value of their debt surge.
The rise in foreign currency debt in Eastern Europe took place at a time when
foreign banks increased their presence in these markets either by setting up
branches or buying local banks. This has led to criticism that foreign currency debt,
and its cost, was ‘pushed’ by foreign banks on local borrowers. The paper rigor-
ously assesses this claim relying on detailed data on the balance sheet of banks in
emerging Europe in the early 1990s. The authors clearly refute the thesis of an
undiscriminating push of foreign currency loans. While foreign banks did issue a
substantial amount of such loans, they did so to a similar extent as domestic banks.
Furthermore, loans were not granted blindly, but instead reflected macroeconomic
fundamentals, with more foreign currency lending in countries where inflation was
more volatile. The policy inference is thus that efforts at limiting the reliance on
foreign currency borrowing should not single-out foreign banks.
The early and late stages of the lending boom
While the BEPS data provide a highly detailed view of banks’ lending activity,
they only cover the first half of the 2000s. The first part of the decade clearly
saw a substantial increase in bank lending to emerging Europe, but this was
dwarfed by the surge between 2004 and the eve of the crisis. Figure 3 shows the
claims of BIS-reporting banks on emerging Europe on a consolidated basis. We
clearly observe that the volume of claims quadrupled between March 2005 and
March 2008, both in terms of cross-border lending and in terms of lending
through local affiliates.
The authors fully acknowledge this limitation of their data, and point out that
the subsequent boom does not make the initial period less informative, as it sets the
stage for the subsequent episode. In Table A1 they show that many countries saw
the share of foreign currency lending increase before the mid-2000s. The period
covered by the paper does indeed lead to interesting insight, and is the only data so
far available on such a disaggregated basis.
The inferences, however, still have to be taken with some caution in terms of
their applicability to the subsequent developments. First, not all countries saw an
increase in lending in the initial years, as shown in Figure 4 which shows the data
from Table A1 for selected countries. Estonia clearly experienced a shift toward for-
eign currency lending in the first half of the decade, which persisted in the second
half. The situation is more contrasted for other countries such as Latvia, however,
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where the initial increase in the share was much less pronounced than for other
countries. In addition, some of the largest countries in the region saw little increase
in the share prior to 2004. This is the case for Poland, where the foreign currency
lending share only increased in the crisis, and fairly moderately, as well as for Hun-
gary where the boom in foreign currency lending appears concentrated on the eve
of the crisis, between 2004 and 2007. The case of Hungary is especially noteworthy
as it is one of the countries where the reliance of households on foreign currency
loans has been the object of extensive policy discussion.
A second reason for caution is that the evidence in Table A1 only pertains to
aggregate trends for foreign banks. It thus does not inform us on whether these
trends differed relative to domestic banks, or whether the connection between eco-
nomic fundamentals and foreign currency lending loosened. Of course this caveat
does not reduce the relevance of studying the lending pattern in the early years,
but merely points to some caution in extending the inferences to subsequent years.
Foreign currency or foreign banks?
The criticism of reliance on foreign banks does not solely link to their issuing for-
eign currency loans, but also relates to the risk that they could quickly pull back
from the marginal markets that emerging countries represent, whereas local banks
would be more inclined to sustain their lending (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011,
however argue that this is not the case).
These two aspects (foreign currency lending, or volatile lending) are often con-
fused in the discussion on foreign banks. It is, however, important to distinguish
them as they have different policy implications. If foreign currency lending is the
problem, then policymakers should explicitly restrict its use for all banks, regardless
of foreign or domestic ownership, for instance by putting in place strict collateral
requirements. If on the other hand reliance on foreign banks entails the risk of
depending on ‘footloose’ funding, then international financial integration should be
sequenced and make more use of more stable sources of funding, such as foreign
direct investment.
An impact of foreign banks through competition?
The central finding of the paper is that foreign banks did not push foreign currency
lending, in the sense that the increase in foreign currency lending is not correlated
with the ownership of the bank.
Yet, the pattern of a broad-based issuance of foreign currency debt can be con-
sistent with a causal role of foreign banks. Consider a situation where domestic
banks are initially reluctant to issue foreign currency loans. The economy then
experiences a substantial entry of foreign banks in the markets, which are keener
on issuing foreign currency debt. As these loans carry a lower interest rate, they are
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attractive for borrowers despite the implied exposure to currency risk. Faced with
this development, domestic banks can stick to their focus on local currency lending,
but will then likely loose market share. They can instead follow the lead of foreign
banks and also issue foreign currency debt. In such a scenario, we would observe
an increase in foreign currency lending for both foreign and domestic banks, even
though the development is triggered by foreign banks by assumption. While
domestic banks will move into foreign currency debt with some delay, this timing is
unlikely to be apparent in infrequent surveys, and capturing it would require more
frequent data.
One thus cannot exclude that domestic banks merely reacted to a development
induced by foreign banks. While the paper does not explicitly address this issue, it
shows that domestic banks did not increase their foreign currency debt to corporate
customers, even though the competitive pressure from foreign banks was also likely
to be present there. This element is indicative that the rise in foreign currency lend-
ing was not solely pushed by foreign banks. It remains nonetheless that future
research should assess the possibility of an indirect impact of foreign banks through
competitive pressures on domestic ones.
Conclusion
The paper shows that the rise in foreign currency lending in emerging Europe can-
not be squarely attributed to a push by foreign banks. If policymakers want to
reduce the reliance of borrowers on such loans, they should then explicitly do so
and not attempt to achieve the objective indirectly by targeting foreign banks.
An interesting avenue for future work is to extend the analysis in two main direc-
tions. First, one should assess whether the patterns documented in the paper apply
to the lending boom in the second half of the 2000s, a period not covered by the
paper. In particular, it will be interesting to assess whether banks facing very low
returns in their mature domestic markets ventured more forcefully into emerging
countries than they did in the first part of the decade. Second, one should consider
whether the issuance of foreign currency loans by local banks solely reflects macro-
economic conditions, or whether it is an indirect consequence of the entrance of
foreign banks and the competitive pressures on incumbents that it entails.
La´szlo´ Halpern
IEHAS and CEPR
The paper adresses a very timely issue – what is the foreign currency exposure in
transition economies and to what extent is it driven by foreign banks. As the large
credit boom experienced in these countries was partly made in foreign currencies
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and when capital flows reversed and exchange rates came under pressure this high
– mostly unhedged – foreign currency exposure became a serious problem for cor-
porations and households. The data used in this paper are unique as there are two
observations – 2001 and 2004 – for individual bank level indicators for transition
economies. The central result of the paper, that is, the rejection of the popular
claim that foreign banks are to be blamed for the high foreign currency exposure
rightly vindicates the attention of analysts and policymakers, too. My main concern
is, however, that the results are not interpreted with due caution; data, their use
and the way the results were obtained raise quite a few questions.
There are four countries – Albania, Hungary, Kazakhstan and the Slovak
Republic – for which either domestic or foreign banks are missing from the sample.
In their case it is impossible to compare the behaviour of foreign and domestic
banks. It would have been more appropriate to leave out these countries from the
whole exercise.
Authors claim that that the period 2001–2004 – that is, the first half of the
2001–2007 credit boom in many parts of emerging Europe – is well suited to study
the determinants of FX lending as it set the scene for later developments. This
claim, however, seems to go beyond the validity of the analysis especially in light of
the changing behaviour of banks, households and corporations during the second
half of the credit boom presented in different EBRD reports.13 As documented in
Table A1, in the case of half of the countries the share of FX lending rose between
2007 and 2010. But only two of them – Hungary and Latvia – showed that the
growth pattern was more or less similar in the two consecutive subperiods between
2004 and 2010, namely in the case of the other countries there was no growth in
the share between 2004 and 2007 on the basis of the IMF data.
Currency composition within foreign currencies should have mattered. As mon-
etary integration with the euro was on the agenda of quite a few countries in the
sample it is relevant what the currency of lending was in these cases. The euro is a
quite natural choice for a medium to long-term credit transaction with a perspect-
ive of monetary integration on the horizon, while the massive lending in Swiss
francs and Japanese yen certainly require additional explanation. Lending in non-
euro, however, was not specific to the countries investigated, as there was massive
lending in Swiss francs in Austria, for example.
The interpretation of the wholesale funding – what captures non-customer liabi-
lities as a share of total liabilities – as an indicator of wholesale funding in foreign
currency does not reflect the heterogeneity of countries in the sample. Although the
assumption as much of the transition region remains characterized by very under-
developed local currency bond and money markets is acceptable but the difference
between countries seems to be even larger than in the case of developed countries.
13 EBRD Transition Report 2010 presents in details how the evolution of FX lending was different after 2004 as compared
to the pre-2004 period by countries and within countries by households and corporations.
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Obviously this heterogeneity can be captured by the country dummies, but the
interpretation of the variable remains unresolved.
The instrument for wholesale funding is the dummy variable internal ratings, which
indicates whether the bank used an internal ratings based approach in 2004. However,
it is not clear whether banks relying on internal ratings differentiated between corporate
and household clients or, put differently, whether this variable is able to capture the
eventual rating difference between corporate and household clients within the bank.
My general concern with respect to the results and conclusions comes from the
lack of robust results; looking at Columns 5 and 10 in Table 4 when country-fixed
effects are included, the significance of foreign ownership and FX deposit vanishes.
It means that when country features are taken into account the key findings are not
supported with sufficient precision.
The claim that the result is mainly driven by between-country variation in FX
deposits rather than between-bank variation in access to FX deposits within coun-
tries would be acceptable if the between-banks variation is properly accounted
for. Foreign banks belong to groups who operate in different countries mostly.
These banks may reveal different patterns of foreign lending beyond the proper-
ties – member of a multinational bank network, loan size, share of real-estate
loans – examined in the paper. These additional features could have been cap-
tured by the country of origin or by the individual multinational bank networks
dummies.
The paper mentions the example of the Czech Republic and Poland, demon-
strating how adherence to credible macroeconomic policies can result in relatively
low levels of FX lending even when a majority of the banking system is foreign
owned. The other appraisal relates to Poland being successful in weighing against
the tide of FX lending by introducing Recommendation S in 2006, which required
banks to apply stricter credit underwriting standards and to disclose FX risks when
providing FX mortgages. The results do not help to discriminate between the above
two possibilities, that is, to what extent sound macroeconomic fundamentals or
macroprudential policies and supervisory regulation can result in low FX exposure.
Panel discussion
Nicola Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln opened the discussion and suggested the authors should
provide a more detailed analysis of the determinants of the increase in foreign lend-
ing to households. She urged the authors to consider other macro-level variables
which may play an important role in foreign lending to households. She highlighted
the similarities in the development of lending in both sectors over the period and
noted that some determinants in the model are found to have similar effects. She
also urged the authors to draw on the related theoretical literature to provide the
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motivation for distinguishing between lending to households and corporate sectors
in their analysis.
Michael Haliassos suggested that the average duration and size of the loans were
two important characteristics that should be controlled for in the model. He
thought it was unlikely that households would consider drawing down small loans
in a foreign currency. He wondered about the role of household financial know-
ledge on the demand for foreign currency loans. He was unsure whether greater
individual financial knowledge meant individuals were more or less inclined to bor-
row in foreign currency or listen to the advice of banks.
Georges de Me´nil believed the paper raised very important questions on whether
policymakers should be concerned about the risk of volatility of the source of fund-
ing of foreign banks and/or the foreign exchange nature of their funding. He
argued that the presence of foreign banks is beneficial and therefore it is necessary
to have appropriate policies which deal with the risks of the inherent structural
change of the increased presence of foreign banks. He agreed that large FX net
liabilities entail a currency risk but he wondered whether it mattered if policy-
makers restrict demand or supply in order to mitigate this risk. Finally, he believed
it was important to emphasize that it was not just bad macroeconomic policy which
led to excessive foreign lending in some Eastern European countries.
Livio Stracca agreed with the discussants that the authors should control for a
country’s exchange rate regime. He also suggested that the risks associated with for-
eign currency lending and exchange rate movements may be to some degree offset
by the foreign currency deposits which are held by banks. Refet Gu¨rkaynak added
that the risk of exchange rate movements are unlikely to be offset for individuals as
they are unlikely to hold both foreign assets and liabilities.
In reply to comments made by the discussants, Martin Brown did not believe it
was wholesale lending which was driving FX in the Eastern Europe. He pointed
out that the increase in FX lending was much stronger in the period 2000–2004
which was before the large increase in wholesale lending which had occurred since
2004. He noted that current policy proposals to curb wholesale lending into East-
ern Europe in order to reduce FX lending and ensure financial stability are based
on a supply-side interpretation of the phenomenon and this was not supported by
their findings.
He accepted that the insignificant effect of contemporaneous monetary policy
on FX lending appeared surprising but noted that this finding is supported by
previous research which shows there is very little effect of exchange rate and
interest rate changes on FX leading over time in a given country. The findings
in this paper suggest that long-run macroeconomic policy variables, such as the
long-run inflation rate and a country’s intention to join the European Union,
matter most.
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APPENDIX
Table A1. Aggregate FX lending in Emerging Europe: 2001–10
Year 2001 2004 2007 2010
Source
BEPS BEPS IMF IMF IMF
(1) (2a) (2b) (3) (4)
Albania 0.83 0.80 0.70 0.71 0.68
Belarus 0.52 0.71 0.58 0.64 0.80
Bosnia and Herzegovina n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.74 0.72
Bulgaria 0.25 0.37 0.48 0.50 0.61
Croatia n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.60 0.73
Estonia 0.37 0.56 0.73 0.78 0.90
FYR Macedonia n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.55 0.58
Hungary 0.20 0.22 0.32 0.53 0.63
Kazakhstan 0.62 0.51 0.52 0.43 0.42
Latvia 0.62 0.66 0.60 0.86 0.92
Lithuania 0.51 0.47 0.58 0.55 0.75
Moldova 0.28 0.24 0.40 0.44 0.42
Poland 0.30 0.27 0.24 0.25 0.33
Romania 0.55 0.69 0.60 0.54 0.63
Russia 0.38 0.33 0.26 0.23 0.22
Serbia 0.35 0.48 n.a. 0.78 0.80
Slovak Republic 0.07 0.09 0.14 0.16 n.a.
Ukraine 0.55 0.59 n.a. 0.50 0.47
Notes: This table provides aggregated country-level data on FX lending for the years 2001, 2004, 2007 and
2010. Data for a number of Balkan countries are not comparable across BEPS and IMF statistics due to a
different treatment of FX-linked loans and therefore not shown. The Slovak Republic joined the eurozone in
2009. n.a.: not available.
Data source: BEPS, IMF Article IV reports and CEIC.
Table A2. Pairwise correlations
Panel A. Bank-level variables: 2004
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
[1] FX share corporates 1.00
[2] FX share households 0.60 1.00
[3] Assets 0.03 0.01 1.00
[4] Wholesale funding 0.16 0.13 0.05 1.00
[5] FX deposits 0.44 0.43 )0.14 )0.11 1.00
[6] Internal ratings )0.08 )0.02 0.05 0.24 )0.10 1.00
[7] Corporate deposits 0.10 0.25 )0.17 0.06 0.29 )0.09 1.00
Panel B. Bank-level variables: 2004–2001 differences
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
[1] FX share corporates 1.00
[2] FX share households 0.27 1.00
[3] FX growth corporates 0.22 0.30 1.00
[4] FX growth households 0.00 0.58 0.29 1.00
[5] Assets )0.02 0.11 0.32 0.50 1.00
[6] Wholesale funding 0.07 0.06 0.14 )0.07 0.20 1.00
[7] FX deposits 0.09 0.26 0.03 0.10 )0.03 )0.04 1.00
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Table A2. (Continued)
Panel C. Country-level variables: 2001–2004 averages
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
[1] Interest rate differential 1.00
[2] Exrate volatility 0.70 1.00
[3] Interest advantage 0.74 0.20 1.00
[4] Inflation history 0.63 0.63 0.22 1.00
[5] EU accession )0.36 )0.27 )0.40 )0.44 1.00
Notes: This table provides pairwise correlations for the 2004 values and 2004–2001 differences of our bank-
level and country-level variables. Table 2 provides variable definitions and sources.
Table A3. Diagnostics of IV estimates in Models 2 and 7 in Table 4
Validity of instruments Strength of instruments
2nd stage dependent
variable
FX share
corporates
FX share
households
FX share
corporates
FX share
households
1st stage dependent
variable
Wholesale
funding
FX
deposits
Wholesale
funding
FX
deposits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Foreign greenfield 5.955 0.227 14.31*** 2.750 15.50*** 3.659
[8.915] [10.23] [4.359] [4.942] [4.456] [4.922]
Foreign takeover 12.93* 1.605 )1.028 )2.405 0.765 )3.095
[6.784] [7.529] [3.566] [4.320] [3.604] [4.239]
Assets 0.763 2.383 0.288 )1.531 0.149 )1.519
[1.678] [2.526] [0.933] [1.141] [0.896] [1.115]
Wholesale funding 0.316** 0.372**
[0.135] [0.173]
FX deposits 0.590*** 0.694***
[0.0843] [0.0843]
Corporate deposits 0.0034 0.15 0.039 0.220** 0.050 0.235**
[0.117] [0.115] [0.0744] [0.0945] [0.0783] [0.0968]
Internal ratings )8.567* )1.925 11.26*** )2.350 10.82*** )3.326
[4.885] [4.964] [3.346] [4.826] [3.354] [4.798]
Method OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Country-fixed effects No No No No No No
R2 0.29 0.25 0.15 0.09 0.16 0.11
No. of banks 155 151 155 155 151 151
F test of Internal
ratings=0 and Corporate
deposits=0 (p-value)
0.20 0.43 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.05
Kleibergen–Paap rk
test (p-value)
0.04 0.01
Notes: This table provides diagnostic tests related to the instrumentation strategy in Table 4. Columns 1 and 2
illustrate the absence of a statistically significant direct impact of the instruments Corporate deposits and Internal
ratings on the share of FX lending. Columns 3 to 6 show the strong correlation between these two instruments
and the endogenous variables Wholesale funding and FX deposits, respectively, in the first-stage regressions.
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